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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to self-determination' is one of the most complex issues in
international affairs. The theory that all peoples have a right to determine
their own political destinies has been almost universally embraced.
Whom this right applies to, and what the right encompasses, however, is
the subject of tremendous debate, not only among scholars, but also
among international leaders. The debate focuses on the inherent tension
between the desire to protect the state sovereignty and the desire to give
groups within states the right to exercise their culture and political will.
The international community fears that by giving groups the right to se-
cede from recognized states, secession attempts will be encouraged, lead-
ing to an increase in the number of states and divisions among them.
Some argue that the right to self determination only includes the right to
a representative government while others argue it is more expansive.
In recent years there has been a tide of nationalist movements and a
rediscovery of ethnic identities. 2 This awakening has led to a demand for
increased autonomy by many groups. There are an estimated 140 groups
asserting their right to self-determination.3 The Quebecois are one of
these groups. At various points throughout Canadian history, the
Quebecois have clamored for their independence from the rest of Canada.
Their demands came to the forefront in the Canadian legal community
when the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue in In re Seces-
sion of Quebec.4 The opinion examined Quebec's right to independence
under Canadian and international law. While acknowledging the right to
self-determination, the Court ultimately determined that Quebec does not
have the right to unilaterally secede.
The Court's decision brings two important issues to the forefront.
First, is the Court's decision in line with the established principles of in-
ternational law? Second, and perhaps more important, who should deter-
mine whether a people should be independent? This Note will examine
1. The International Court of Justice in Morocco v. Spain defined the right of self-
determination as "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples." 1975
I.C.J. 12, at 33.
2. Edward Canuel, Note, Nationalism, Self-Determination, and Nationalist Move-
ments: Exploring the Palestinian and Quebec Drives for Independence, 20 B.C. INTL. &
COMP L. REV. 85, 85 (1997).
3. Halim Moris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 4
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L 201, 201 (1997).
4. In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain ques-
tions relating to the secession of Quebec from Canada, as set out in Order in Council
PC. 1996-1947, dated the 30" day of September, 1996. Indexed as: Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec. 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 [hereinafter In Re Secession of Quebec].
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both of these questions. However, before delving into those topics, some
background of right to self-determination is necessary.5 The first portion
of the paper will discuss the case itself, including the Court's examina-
tion of its jurisdiction, secession under Canadian law, and secession
under international law. The next portion will examine the principle of
self-determination under international law as it is explained in various
United Nations Declarations. How the principle is applied, the balance
between self-determination and the protection of states, who has the right
to self-determination, and the level of scrutiny that is applied to claims
of the right to self-determination are issues that will be discussed. An ex-
amination of these issues demonstrates that the Court's decision is in line
with current principles of international law. Finally, the paper will ex-
amine whether the Canadian Supreme Court should have decided whether
Quebec has the right to secede.
II. IN RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC
The Governor in Council brought the case to the Supreme Court.6
The Court was asked to give its opinion regarding the legality of unilat-
eral secession if Quebec passed a referendum in favor of secession. The
Governor in Council presented three questions to the Court:
Question 1: Under the Constitution of Canada, can the Na-
tional Assembly, legislature of government of Quebec effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
Question 2: Does international law give the National Assem-
bly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is
there a right to self-determination under international law that
would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of
Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada
unilaterally?
Question 3: In the event of a conflict between domestic and
international law on the right of the National Assembly legisla-
ture of government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec
from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in
5. The history of self-determination is extensive. Countless leaders and scholars have
proposed numerous ways to interpret the right of self-determination. The purpose of this
comment is not to present all of the theories of self-determination but to provide the
reader with sufficient background so that s/he can draw his/her own conclusions about the
soundness of the Court's reasoning.
6. In Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, 2.
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Canada?7
After much discussion, the Court concluded that the Canadian Con-
stitution does not give Quebec the right to unilaterally secede.8 Further-
more, the Court determined that international law and the principle of
self-determination do not confer the right to secession.9 In view of the
fact that the Court determined that there was no conflict between Cana-
dian and international law, the Court did not answer the third question.10
Prior to examining these questions the Court first addressed the
question of whether it had jurisdiction to answer the questions
presented."I Ultimately, the Court concluded that they had jurisdiction12
and proceeded to analyze the Canadian Constitution and international law
in-depth. A summation of the Court's findings is given below.
A. Jurisdiction of the Court
In determining whether the Court has authority to answer the ques-
tions presented, the Court had to assess whether the Court had the au-
thority to issue advisory opinions and whether, given the political and in-
ternational implications, the Court could issue and opinion on this
particular matter.13
After examining various Constitutional provisions, the Court con-
cluded that it not only had the authority to issue advisory opinions, but
\ indeed, it had a duty to do so. 14 The Court determined that it had the au-
thority to issue advisory opinions on "legal questions touching and con-
cerning the future of the Canadian federation," 15 and therefore it had the
authority to issue its opinion in this case. Thus, because secession con-
cerns the future of Canada the Court had the obligation to answer the
Governor in Council's question regarding secession under Canadian law. 16
Next, the Court looked to see if they could answer questions that
were political in nature and, at least to a certain degree, highly specula-
tive. 17 Reasoning that the Canadian Constitution does not insist on a strict
7. Id. 12.
8. Id. 147.
9. Id. 151.
10. Id. 144.
11. Id. (H 3-30.
12. Id. 1 30.
13. Id. 3.
14. Id. 7 7.
15. Id. 1 19.
16. Id. 1 30.
17. Id. 23.
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separation of powers, the Court rejected an amicus curie's18 argument that
the Canadian Supreme Court, like the U.S. Supreme Court, could only
answer actual cases and controversies. 19 Because the Court is not under
the same "case and controversies" requirement they do not have to wait
until a referendum in favor of secession is passed but could issue their
opinion as to the legality of it prior to the referendums passage. 20 The
Court also explained that they were not taking power away from the leg-
islature to decide this question for itself but merely setting the ground
rules that should control the political process. 21
The amicus curiae's third objection to the Court's jurisdiction was
that the Court should not answer the Governor in Council's second ques-
tion because it would require the Court to interpret international rather
then domestic law. 22 The Court's response to this proposal was straight-
forward: "This concern is groundless." ' 23 Having looked at international
law for guidance in making other decisions, the court determined that it
was in essence doing the same thing in this situation. Furthermore, they
stated that by issuing an advisory opinion the Court would not be "pur-
porting to 'act as' or substitute itself for an international tribunal, ' 24 nor
would their decision bind any other state or international tribunal.2 Fur-
thermore, the Court reasoned that it was not answering a question of
pure international law but determining the legal rights and obligations of
the government of Quebec which is under the legal system of Canada
and thus under the jurisdiction of the Court.
B. Secession Under Canadian Law
In assessing whether secession is valid under the Canadian Constitu-
tion, the Court examined the principles of federalism, democracy, Consti-
tutionalism and the rule of law.26 Since these principles are the central
underpinnings for the Constitution, and thus governmental system of Ca-
18. The Court does not specify who is the amicus curiae. Id. 3.
19. Id. 1 12.
20. Id. 26.
21. Id. 99.
22. Id. 1 20.
23. Id. 21.
24. Id. 1 19.
25. Id. 19.
26. Id. 31-104.
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nada,27 the Court discussed each at length.
1. Federalism
The Court noted that the existence of Quebec as a culturally unique
group was one of the primary reasons for the formation of the federal
system.28 Canada was originally formed by merging the provinces of Ca-
nada West (Ontario), Canada East (Quebec), and the Maritime Prov-
inces.29 Each region wanted to maintain a certain amount of autonomy
and Quebec wanted, and received, guarantees that French culture and lan-
guage would be protected. 30 Significant powers were granted to provin-
cial governments in order to accommodate the diverse interests in the ini-
tial confederation. 31 The Court noted that: "the principle of federalism
recognizes the diversity of the component parts of Confederation, and the
autonomy of provincial governments to develop their societies within
their respective spheres of jurisdiction. '3 2
The importance of federalism in a discussion of the right to self-
determination cannot be underestimated. As will be discussed later, the
right to self determination is the right to develop a society in the way
that a particular People see fit. In explaining the principle of federalism,
the Court is distinguishing between the right to determine the cultural
and political development of a people and the right of those People to
claim independence. The degree of autonomy that the provinces have in
Canada confers the right to develop culturally and politically, 33 but the
right to develop culturally and politically does not confer the right to
secede.
2. Democracy
Democracy encapsulates the right of citizens to participate in gov-
ernment. 34 The Court noted that "democracy is commonly understood as
being a political system of majority rule."' 35 However, the Court clarified
that since Canada is a federal system there may be different majorities at
27. Id. 48.
28. Id. 57.
29. The Court gives a brief history of the formation of Canada and the history of
federalism since 1867. Id. [ 32-47.
30. Id. 37-40.
31. Id.1 42.
32. Id. 1 56.
33. Id. 1 56.
34. Id. 1 63.
35. Id. 1 61.
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different levels of government.36 The wishes of majorities, both at the
provincial and federal level, must be respected since neither majority is
more legitimate than the other.37 In a democratic system there is a contin-
uous process of discussion since building majorities "necessitates com-
promise, negotiation and deliberation."38 The inevitable dissenting voices
must be recognized and their concerns must be considered within the
framework of the democratic system which all live.39
The legitimacy of governmental decisions, the Court notes, rests on
the interactions between the wishes of the majority and the rule of law.n°
The rule of law creates the framework in which the sovereign will of the
people can be implemented. 41 In order for a democratic institution to be
legitimate its actions must be in accordance with the law and the moral
values imbedded in Canada's constitutional structure.42
3. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law
The Canadian Constitution represents the basis for all Canadian
laws.43 "Any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." 44 The
Constitution binds all governments, federal and provincial, because the
government's sole claim to authority is the power that is given to govern-
ments by the Constitution.45 Thus, Quebec could not pass a law that
would override the Constitution. 46 The Court held that the Constitution is
beyond the reach of simple majority rule for three principle reasons: as a
safeguard for fundamental rights and freedoms 47 to ensure that minorities
have the "rights necessary to maintain and promote their identities
against the assimilative pressure of the majority;" 48 to protect the differ-
ent branches of government from having their power usurp by other
branches. 49
36. Id. 64.
37. Id. 64.
38. Id. 1 66.
39. Id. 66.
40. Id. 65.
41. Id. 65.
42. Id. 65.
43. Id. 70.
44. Id. 1 70.
45. Id. 70.
46. Id. 73.
47. Id. 72.
48. Id. 1 72. For more discussion on the protection of minorities see 77-80.
49. Id. 72.
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The Court explains that the principles of Constitutionalism are in
harmony with the principles of democracy, in that Constitutionalism cre-
ates an "orderly framework within which people may make political de-
cisions." 50 The constitutional rules are not meant to frustrate the will of
the majority of people, but merely to define what majority must be con-
sulted in order to alter "the fundamental balances of political power, in-
dividual rights, and minority rights." 51 The rules that the Court adopts re-
quire a majority in Quebec to negotiate and compromise with the
majority in the rest of Canada if they wish to add a constitutional amend-
ment that would allow Quebec to secede.52 According to the Court this
negotiation would ensure the fundamental rights of all involved,53 and
would harmoniously combine the principles of Constitutionalism and
democracy.54
4. Constitutional Principles in the Context of Secession
The Court concedes that the Constitution is silent about whether a
province may secede from the union.55 However, the Court explains that
secession would alter the governmental structure of Canada in a way that
is clearly inconsistent with the current constitutional arrangements.56 The
Court does, however, say that if a referendum in favor of secession is
taken, and the majority of Quebecois vote to secede, the rest of Canada
would have an obligation to negotiate constitutional changes with the
Quebec government to respond to the Quebecois desire to secede.57
Neither the federal government, nor the other provincial governments,
would have a "basis to "deny the right of the government of Quebec to
pursue secession, should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose
that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights of others."5"
Once the majority of Quebecois vote in favor of secession, the Court
continued, there would have to be a negotiation process and a reconcilia-
tion of the various rights and obligations between Quebec and the rest of
Canada.5 9
50. Id. 76.
51. Id. 174.
52. Id. 1 86.
53. Id. 74.
54. Id. 75.
55. id. 82.
56. Id. 82.
57. Id. 86.
58. Id. 90.
59. Id. 86.
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The Court determined that a decision by the Quebecois to secede
would put the interdependent relationship between the provinces at risk
and would affect the economic, social, and political environment of the
country.6° "Nobody seriously suggests that our national existence, seam-
less in so many aspects, could be effortlessly separated along what are
now the provincial boundaries of Quebec." ' 6' The magnitude of such a
decision, and its myriad implications of that decision, would require both
sides of the conflict to work together to arrive at an equitable solution.62
The Court carefully pointed out that in these negotiations neither
party may exercise their rights so that the rights of the other party is ab-
solutely denied. 63 "There can be no suggestion that either of these major-
ities trumps the other." 64 The parties should negotiate with the principles
of federalism, democracy, Constitutionalism and protection of minorities
in mind.65 The Court mentioned that a refusal by either party to conduct
negotiations in line with these principles would jeopardize the legitimacy
of that party's asserted rights.66 Furthermore, the Court comments that
this refusal may jeopardize that parties position in the eyes of the inter-
national community.67
C. The Court's Evaluation of Secession Under International Law
Having determined that there is no right for Quebec to unilaterally
secede under Canadian law, the Court turned its attention to secession
under international law. The Court began its discussion by asserting "it is
clear that international law does not specifically grant component parts of
sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their parent
state." '68 In making this assertion, the Court argued that neither the ab-
sence of a provision explicitly denying the right to secession, 69 nor the
right of self-determination implies that the right of secession for every
group exists.70
In examining the absence of a provision denying the right to secede,
the Court discussed the international communities' respect for the integ-
60. Id. 94. See also Marchildon & Maxwell infra note 103 at 615-619.
61. In Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, 94.
62. Id. 94.
63. Id. 1 90.
64. Id. 1 91.
65. Id. 92.
66. Id. 93.
67. Id. 101.
68. Id. 1 108.
69. Id. 109.
70. Id. 1 135.
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rity of states. "International law places great importance on the territorial
integrity of nation states and by and large leaves the creation of a new
state to be determined by the domestic law of the existing state of which
the seceding entity presently forms a part." ' 71 The Court determined that
since Quebec's secession would be contrary to the constitution and laws
of Canada, the international law is likely to accept the Court's conclusion
unless it is contrary to the right of self-determination. 72
The right of self-determination has gone beyond mere convention
and has become an established principle of international law that must be
upheld.73 Recognizing this, the Court proceeded to examine several
United Nations agreements that acknowledge the right of self-
determination and explained why these agreements are inapplicable in the
Quebec/Canada situation. The four main agreements74 that the Court
looked to were the UN's International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights 7 5 the UN General Assembly's Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations,76 the Vienna Decla-
71. Id. 109.
72. Id. 109.
73. Id. 1 111.
74. Id. (H 111-118.
75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/ 6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1996). "All
peoples have the right to self determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."
Id. Art. 1.
76. United Nations General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A Res. 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 24 October 1970.
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations.]
"By virtue of the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations all peoples have the right
freely to determine, without external interference their political status and to
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development and every State has the
duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Every state has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, real-
ization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the
United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter
regarding the implementation of the principle in order:
(a) to promote friendly relations and co-operation among states; and
(b) to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely ex-
pressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a viola-
tion of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is
contrary to the Charter.
Every state has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal re-
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ration and Programme of Action, 77 and the Helsinki Final Act.78 All of
these agreements purport to give the right of self-determination to Peo-
ples. However, the Court explains, international law expects that the right
of self-determination can be exercised within the framework of estab-
lished states, and only in exceptional circumstances should the territorial
integrity of those states be infringed upon to give a Peoples the right to
spect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with
the Charter
The establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free association or inte-
gration with an independent state or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right to self-determination
by that peoples."
77. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Document A/CONF.157/24
October 13, 1993.
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
Taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, the World Conference on
Human Rights recognizes the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to realize their inalienable
right of self-determination.
In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States con-
ducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.
78. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 14 I.L.M.
1292 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. Part VIII:
"The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right
to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of
international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as
they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interfer-
ence, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural
development.
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for
and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the
development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they
also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this
principle."
1999]
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secede.7 9
The Court then proceeded to examine the definition of a People
under international law. It recognizes that People may mean only a por-
tion of the population in an existing state.8° The Court concedes that
much of the Quebec population has many characteristics of a People. 8'
However, the Court determined that "it is not necessary to explore this
legal characterization to resolve Question 2 appropriately. ' 82 According
to the Court, even if the Quebecois are considered a people, that in itself
does not give them the right to unilaterally secede from Canada.83
The right to self-determination must be balanced with respect to the
territorial integrity of existing states.84 These principles are not incompat-
ible, particularly in countries like Canada. 85 Under international law, "a
state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimi-
nation, and respects the principles of self-determination in its own inter-
nal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under international law of
its territorial integrity."' 86 As the basis for this assertion the Court cites
the Declaration of Friendly Relations and the Vienna Declaration.8 7
The Court then addresses the issue of whether the Quebecois have
the right to secede because they have been denied meaningful access to
government 88 The Court ultimately concludes that since they have access
to government they do not have the right to secede. 9 The Court notes
that Canada, as a democracy, guarantees all citizens the right to partici-
pate in government. 90 The Court cites numerous examples that indicate
that the Quebecois have had meaningful access to government. 91 Primary
among these examples is the fact that Quebecois have occupied promi-
nent positions in the government of Canada.92 Indeed, a Quebecois has
been the Prime Minister of Canada for 40 out of the last 50 years. 93 Ac-
79. In Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, [ 119.
80. Id. 121.
81. Id. 1 122.
82. Id. 122.
83. Id. 122.
84. Id. 1 124.
85. Id. 127.
86. Id. T 127.
87. Id. 1 125-126, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
88. Id. %1 131-135.
89. Id. 1 133.
90. Id. T 59.
91. Id. N 132-133.
92. Id. T 133.
93. Id. 1 132.
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cording to the Court, these facts indicate that "the Quebec people is
manifestly not .. . an oppressed people." 94
In summary, the Court concludes that:
[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates,
at best, a right to external self-determination in situations of for-
mer colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under
foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural development. In all three situations,
the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-
determination because they have been denied the ability to exert
internally their right to self-determination. Such exceptional cir-
cumstances are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec under existing
conditions .95
III. SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Woodrow Wilson, who was one of the first to articulate the right to
self-determination, once stated that "No people must be forced under
sovereignty under which it does not wish to live."' 96 Upon reflecting on
the effect of his words Wilson said: "When I gave utterance to those
words I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed ....
You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have exper-
ienced as the result of these many millions of people having their hopes
raised by what I said."' 97 These two statements reflect the inherent ten-
sion in the goal underlying the principle of self-determination. The goal
is that all peoples should have the government they desire, but the reality
of implementing this ideal is that states, and the international system
94. Id. 132.
95. Id. 1 135.
96. Message from President Wilson to Russia on the Occasion of the Visit of the
American Mission, reprinted in Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals, De-
cember 1916 to November 1918, at 105 (James B. Scott ed., 1921). Quoted in Lawrence
Eastwood Jr., Secession: State Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE. J. COMp. & INT'L L. 299, 299 (1993).
97. Text of a meeting between President Wilson, Frank P. Walsh and Edward F.
Dunne, Paris, June 11, 1919, submitted for the record by Frank P. Walsh in testimony
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Treaty of Peace
With Congress, quoted in Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-
Determination 11 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 433, 458-459. For more about President Wilson's
ideas regarding self-determination see Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-8 (1993).
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based on statehood, would break down with hundreds of groups claiming
independence. 9 President Wilson's second statement may illustrate that
when he realized the number of nationalities in the world, he realized
that the ideal he enunciated could not become reality in a system of
states that are made up of different nations and peoples.99
Wilson's initial declaration has been the subject of a discussion
among commentators and international leaders that has spanned the gen-
erations.' °° The principle of self-determination has been debated through-
out the history of the United Nations, and its predecessor the League of
Nations. 01 The League of Nations chose not to mention the right to self-
determination in its Charter because it was fearful that mentioning it
would lead to demands of independence by various ethnic and further
fragmentation of countries. 02 The United Nations has sent mixed
messages regarding what the right to self-determination means and to
whom it applies. 103
A. The Principle of Self-Determination Under United Nations
Declarations
The United Nations Charter expresses "respect for the principle of
98. See Frederic Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations
Era, 88 A.J.I.L. 304 (1994).
99. See also ROBERT LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE
97-98 (1921).
The more I think about the President's declaration as the right to 'self-
determination,' the more convinced I am of the danger of . . . such ideas
What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the
nationalist among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebel-
lion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly Morocco
and Tripoli rely on it?...
The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can
never be realized. It will, I fear, cost, thousand of lives . . . . What a calamity
that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!
Id. quoted in Michael Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-
Determination, and the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47
DRAKE L. REV. 209, 210 (1999).
100. See Hannum, supra note 97.
101. For a discussion of self-determination in the League of Nations and the United
Nations see Eastwood, supra note 96 at 302-304.
102. Carsten Ebenroth & Matthew Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature of Ques-
tions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest of Objective Standards, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L. ECON L. 753, 805 n.284 (1996).
103. Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under
Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L 583, 602-608 (1992) (discussing con-
tradictions in the development of the concept of self-determination).
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equal rights and self-determination of peoples."1° The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights states "The will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of the government."' 15 While this statement, in and of it-
self, does not affirm the right to self-determination, implicit in this state-
ment is the idea that governments must follow the will of the people they
govern. The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights °6 is more explicit in regard to the right to self-determination. It,
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 107 which re-
iterates verbatim this portion of the Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights, states, "[a]ll peoples have the right to self determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."'' 0 8 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights elaborates and im-
poses a duty on member states to promote the realization of the right to
self-determination. 109
The Declaration on Friendly Relations"0 reaffirms the right of self-
determination. It equates violating the principle of self-determination with
violating fundamental human rights."' It is the first Declaration to de-
clare that "establishment of a sovereign and independent state ... consti-
tute modes of implementing the right of self-determination.""l 2 Commen-
tators have suggested that this statement recognizes the legitimacy of
secession in certain circumstances.'
Paragraph seven of the Declaration on Friendly Relations asserts:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as author-
izing of encouraging any action which would dismember or im-
pair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in com-
pliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 2 & art. 55.
105. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
Art. 21 Para. 3 (1948).
106. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 75.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 220, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).
108. Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights supra note 75, Art. 1. Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, supra note 107 art.1.
109. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 107, Art. 1 sect. 3.
110. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Mitchell Hill, What the Principle of Self-Determination Means Today, 1 ILSA
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 119, 128 (1995).
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of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race creed or colour.114
This statement has been interpreted to authorize secession of peoples
from states that do not conduct themselves in compliance with the princi-
ple of self-determination." 5 Furthermore, the Declaration imposes a re-
quirement that governments be representative of the people they gov-
ern. 116 If the government is not representative, this Declaration suggests
that secession may be a legitimate exercise of the right of self-
determination." 7
The Helsinki Final Act"18 goes further than the Declaration on
Friendly Relations in that it explicitly broadens the right of self-
determination to include a right to secession. The Act states in relevant
part: "By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine,
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status."" 19
The internal right to self-determination is the right to have a representa-
tive government, while external self-determination is the right to se-
cede. 120 The Helsinki Final Act recognized both of these rights. However,
it is important to note that the Helsinki Final Act is not an international
convention and has not yet attained the status of customary international
law. 121 Nonetheless, the Act is significant because it strengthens the prin-
ciple of self-determination articulated by the United Nations. 22
The Vienna Declaration 23 was adopted at the World Conference on
Human Rights in 1993. This Declaration recognizes the right of a peo-
ples to take "any legitimate action" which is in compliance with the
United Nation's Charter to realize their right to self-determination. 24 Fur-
thermore, it reiterates paragraph seven of the Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations that recognized the right to have a representative government.
114. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76.
115. Hill, supra note 113, at 129.
116. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76.
117. Hill, supra note 113, at 129.
118. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 78.
119. Id.
120. Moris, supra note 3, at 204-205.
121. The Helsinki Final Act has been signed by thirty-three states in Europe, as well
as the United States and Canada; however it has "no legally binding effect." Supra note
78.
122. Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 103, at 605.
123. Vienna Declaration, supra note 77.
124. Id.
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It is apparent from these Declarations that the right of self-
determination has become an actual, although limited, legal right under
international law. 25 Self-determination is no longer merely a moral prin-
ciple that states can overlook.
B. The Application of the Right to Self-Determination
Because the right to self-determination, and to a lesser degree seces-
sion, is favorably addressed in United Nations Declarations, it is intrigu-
ing that many commentators suggest that positive international law does
not recognize the right of national groups to separate themselves from
their parent state.' 26 The international community has limited the applica-
tion of the right to self-determination.1 27 In practice, the international
community has not acted beyond the assertion that people have the right
"to be free from foreign domination." 128 Both the scope of the right, and
to whom the right applies, have undergone much transformation in recent
years. 129
1. The Scope of the Right of Self-Determination and the Le-
gitimacy of States3°
Scholars and international leaders' 3' have drawn a distinction be-
tween the right to self-determination and the right to secession. Some
commentators believe that the right to self-determination is only an inter-
nal right in that it gives groups the right to have a government that rep-
resents them. 132 By having a representative government, groups have right
125. Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 103, at 603.
126. Eastwood, supra note 103, at 302.
127. See infra notes 147-206 and accompanying text.
128. Moris, supra note 3, at 209.
129. See Eastwood supra note 96, at 315-332. Eastwood notes that after decoloniza-
tion there was a reluctance by all states to recognize secessionist movements. However,
following the recognition of secessionist movements in former Yugoslavia there was more
willingness on the part of the international community to recognize these movements.
Eastwood also points out that international law still does not have a positive right of se-
cession. Id.
130. See Alison Grabell, Comment, New Northern Neighbor? An Independent Que-
bec, the United States and the NAFTA, 2 Sw. J.L & TRADE AM. 265, 268 (1995).
131. In 1970, United Nations Secretary General U. Thant stated "As an international
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not be-
lieve it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of a Member State." Secre-
tary-General's Press Conferences, UN Monthly Chron., Feb. 1970, at 34-36, quoted in
Eastwood, supra, note 96, at 304 n. 23.
132. For a discussion on internal and external self-determination, see Moris, supra
note 3, at 210-212.
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to shape their respective destinies by influencing leaders through the
power to vote them out of office. The underlying justification for this in-
terpretation is the protection of legitimate states, and to ensure interna-
tional stability.133
Contemporary secession claims violate territorial integrity,"34 the
central characteristic of international law.135 Some commentators believe
that giving minorities or groups within states the right to secede would
"destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in
international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the
very idea of the State as a territorial and political unit."'' 36 Thus, there is
a rebuttable presumption in favor of statehood.'37 The reason for this pre-
sumption is clear. The United Nations is comprised of states and not of
groups of peoples. Thus, one of the central precepts of the United Na-
tions is that the integrity of legitimate states must be respected and
preserved. 38
The definition of a "legitimate" state, as well as the level of protec-
tion that states whose legitimacy is in question deserve, is unsettled. To
reiterate what was briefly discussed in the previous section, the Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations counsels that in order to be legitimate states
must have a government that represents all of the people in the state
without racial or ethnic distinctions. "9 Furthermore, it suggest that only
states conducting themselves in compliance with this principle have the
right to be free from interference.14° Paragraph seven of that Declaration
declares that secession may be a legitimate option for certain groups if
the government is not representative.14 However, the Declaration is quick
to point out that nothing in that statement should be construed as encour-
aging dismemberment of states. 42 The Declaration on the Granting of In-
133. Eastwood, supra note 96, at 315.
134. Derege Demissie, Note, Self-Determination Including Secession vs. The Territo-
rial Integrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L. REV. 165, 170 (1996).
135. Lawrence Frankel, International Law of Secession: New Rules for a New Era,
14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 521, 523 (1992).
136. Kirgisl supra note 98, at 305.
137. Eastwood, supra note 96, at 338.
138. See Hill, supra note 113, at 127.
139. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76. See also Hill, supra note
113, at 125.
140. Hill, supra note 113, at 127.
141. Declarations on Friendly Relations, supra note 76. The Declaration states:
"The establishment of a sovereign and independent state, . . . constitutes modes of im-
plementing the right of self-determination by that people." Id.
142. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76.
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dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, clearly stated this con-
straint when it said that: "Any attempts aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations." 143
These Declarations indicate that secession may be legitimate in very
limited circumstances and that a case by case analysis is necessary to de-
termine whether the right to self-determination includes the right to se-
cede. There are primarily only two recognized reasons for secession, ei-
ther to undo past wrong as in cases of decolonization, or to undue
present repression of a minority group. 144 There is a balancing test in as-
sessing a group's right to secede. On the one hand, the international com-
munity seeks to protect the integrity of states and to discourage division.
On the other hand, the community has an interest in protecting the
human rights of minorities and preventing outbreaks of civil war over se-
cessionist claims.
2. Who Has the Right to Self-Determination?
In certain circumstances the right to self-determination may include
the right to secede; however, there is still division among commentator
on who should be allowed to exercise that right. 145 Commentators agree
that there are three requirements before a group may successfully assert
their right to self-determination; a) they must be a people, b) they must
be oppressed, and c) they must have been a colony. 146 Each of these cate-
gories has requirements within itself, and shall be examined separately
and in the context of the Quebec.
a. People
UNESCO outlined seven characteristics that define a people: a com-
mon history, a common racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity,
linguistic unity, common religion or ideological affinity, territorial con-
nectedness, and a common economic life. 147 Under this definition a sim-
ple minority group that is dispersed throughout a state may not be con-
sidered a people with the right to secede because they fail to meet the
"territorial connectedness" requirement. The United Nations Human
143. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
144. Jane Stromseth, Self-determination, Secession and Humanitarian Intervention
by the United Nations, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 370, 371 (1992)
145. See infra notes 148-206 and accompanying text.
146. Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 103, at 590.
147. Demissie, supra note 134, at 172.
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Rights Committee has said that "peoples" have a right to self-
determination but mere "minorities" do not have the same right. 148
On the surface the Quebecois seem to meet all of the UNESCO re-
quirements. The French Quebecois share a history, language, and religion
that is distinct from the majority in Canada. The Quebecois originally
were descendants of the French colonists. The English settled the rest of
Canada. The Quebecois are predominately Catholic, whereas English-
speaking Canada is predominately Protestant. While throughout history
there has been much disunity between the two groups, there has also
been a gradual integration on an economic level since Canada's incep-
tion, over 131 years ago.149
It is significant that the government of Canada has recognized that
the Quebecois have a history that is distinct from the majority of Canada.
In 1987, the Prime Minister and ten Provincial Premiers signed the
Meech Lake Accord that recognized Quebec as a distinct society. 150 The
Meech Lake Accord was never ratified because of fears about its impact
on Quebec's language minorities and concerns about the impact of the
"distinct society" clause.' 51 In 1992, the Charlottetown Accords reiterated
this recognition and sought to give Quebec the authority to preserve and
promote that society. The Anglophone provinces eventually rejected the
Charlottetown Accords because it gave Quebec special privileges. Quebec
also rejected it because it felt Accord did not protect French culture
enough.152 Although the Charlottetown Accords was not ratified, the fact
that it exists and was debated, illustrates that even within Canada there
are groups on both sides of the debate that recognize the Quebecois as a
distinct people, and a group that should have special protections.
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized Quebec's distinctiveness
in its discussion of federalism 153 and later when it discussed secession
under international law. 154 The Court concluded that although the
Quebecois are culturally unique, uniqueness alone does not confer the
148. Benedict Kingsbury, Self-Determination and Aindigenous Peoples, 86 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 383, 388 (1992).
149. In re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, 37-40.
150. Rachel Guglielmo, "Three Nations Warring in the Bosom of a Single State" An
Exploration of Identity and Self-Determination in Quebec, 21 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 197, 200 (1997).
151. Deborah Richardson, The Quebec Independence Vote and Its Implications of
English Language Legislation, 26 GA. J. LNT'L & COMP. L. 521 n.53 and accompanying
text. (1997).
152. Id. at 531
153. In re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, 57.
154. Id. 1 122. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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right to secession.'55 This evaluation is in accordance with the current re-
quirements of international law. To have the right to secede a group must
be an oppressed people in a former colony.
156
The province of Quebec however is not solely comprised of French
Quebecois. There are substantial Cree 57 and Anglophone populations.
These populations do not share the same history, language, culture and
ethnic-identity as the French Quebecois. Lucien Buchard, the leader of
the separationist's movement in the Canadian Parliament once defended
his movement by saying "Ours is not an ethnic nationalism, for it recog-
nizes that the 'nation Quebecois' is constituted by the people as a whole
who inhabit Quebec."'' 58 Yet, the results of the 1995 referendum indicate
that there is a clear division on ethnic lines as to whether Quebec should
secede.' 59 The French speaking Quebecois voted by solid majority for se-
cession, while voters whose mother tongue is English or a language other
than French voted almost unanimously to remain a part of Canada.
60
This detail illustrates that if there were a separation the wishes of the
Cree and Anglophone population must be reconciled with the wishes of
the French Quebecois. Separation of Quebec from Canada could not be
simply along provincial lines without a guarantee those Cree and An-
glophone populations' rights would be protected. To date this guarantee
has not been forthcoming.
16 1
155. Id.
156. See infra notes 162-206 and accompanying text.
157. Guglielmo, supra note 150, at 203-204.
The claim of the 12,000 Cree Indians living in Quebec, that they, too con-
stitute a distinct people, is at least as strong as the claim make by the French-
speakers. Cree speak a separate language, practice a distinct lifestyle, and em-
brace a different set of beliefs and values than the majority culture
Id.
158. Andrew Stark, Adieu, Liberal Nationalism, N.Y. TmIMES, November 2, 1995, at
A27.
159. Id.
160. Id. This article also notes that "Quebec's secessionist Premier, Jacques
Parizeau, blamed the "ethnic vote" for the defeat, claimed moral victory because a
francophone majority had supported independence, and promised "revenge."" Id. This
comment illustrates that there is deep division between the French Quebecois and the
people who are not of French dissent. Furthermore, it may be an indication that "minori-
ties in a sovereign Quebec would receive unjust treatment from the new state." Bryan
Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model Declaration on the Right of Secession, 11 N.Y.
INT'L. L. REv. 1, 52 (1998).
161. Guglielmo, supra note 150, at 208. Guglielmo also notes that the "Vice-
premier of Quebec Bernard Landry has been quoted in Le Devoir, a leading Quebec
newspapers, as confirming 'that a sovereign Quebec will not fund ethnic groups to pro-
mote their own languages and that the PQ government is against multiculturalism." Id.
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b. Oppression
The second requirement that a group claiming the right to self-
determination must meet is that of oppression. The underlying purpose of
this requirement is to ensure that states who do not violate a group's
rights will not be dismembered unnecessarily. As mentioned earlier, there
is a presumption in favor of maintaining the integrity of states. 162 This
presumption can only be overcome if it is part of a decolonization plan
or if there is evidence of oppression. What is important in the Quebec/
Canada situation is the definition of oppression.163
It is generally accepted that physical oppression of a group may
give rise to a right of self-determination. Nearly all of the successful se-
cession attempts 64 involved some form of physical oppression, such as
torture or imprisonment that are violations of human rights.165 It is clear
that the Quebecois have not suffered physical oppression under the Cana-
dian government.1 66 They do not claim that they have been torture or
mistreated. The Supreme Court decision says that because the Quebecois
"are manifestly not an oppressed people" they are not entitled to unilat-
erally secede under international law.167
Physical oppression, however, is not the only form of oppression.
Some scholars argue that in certain circumstances cultural suppression
may be sufficient to meet the oppression requirement. 168 Alan Buchanan
suggests that there may be a basis for secession on a cultural preserva-
tion ground if a culture is in genuine danger of being destroyed in the
near future. 169 To be considered cultural oppression, the threat to a cul-
162. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
163. Eastwood suggests that oppression could be defined "to include the violation
of the fundamental human rights of the individuals making up the group or the discrimi-
natory denial of political power, such as the right to vote or seek political office, to a
particular group by the parent state." Eastwood, supra, note 96, at 341-342.
164. Not including those that were a part of decolonization.
165. The secession of Eritrea and the partition of Yugoslavia are examples of sepa-
ration because of physical oppression.
166. See E.J. Arnett, "The law is on Canada's side, not the separatists," GLOBE AND
MAIL, 3 January 1995, A17, quoted in Gugliemo, supra note 150, at 208. "The
Quebecois have no legal right of secession under international law because they are not
in a state of colonial oppression and are not suffering grave injustices. On the contrary,
they have a high degree of "self- determination" within Canada." Id.
167. In re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, 135.
168. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights states that all parties to the Covenant "recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take
part in cultural life." See supra note 75.
169. ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 52-64.
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ture must be grave and immediate. 170 It cannot merely be a lack of sup-
port of a culture by the government, but must be demonstrated through
an unwillingness of the government to allow a particular culture to ex-
press itself.17'
The Quebecois Party bases their claim that Quebec should be inde-
pendent on the belief that the government of Canada does not protect
French culture sufficiently. 72 Quebec's rejection of the Charlottetown Ac-
cord, which would have given the province authority to promote French
culture, based on the belief that it did not adequately protect French in-
terests, suggests that Quebecois believe that there is a serious threat to
French culture and that French culture must be preserved. 73 However,
the law declaring that French and English are the official languages and
must both be recognized and utilized demonstrates that the Canadian
government is making efforts to promote, if not French culture, at least
French language. As Rachel Guglielmo states, "Secession on the grounds
of an immediate and serious threat to the survival of French culture does
not seem justified. It seems questionable whether even full independence
could grant the French leadership in Quebec any more control over pro-
tection of their collective identity than they already have." 114
Mr. Parizeau and Mr. Bouchard, the secessionist leaders, have ratio-
nalized their movement by asserting that "Quebec had finally, after cen-
turies, become 'conscious of its identity,' 'attained a new self-
consciousness' or 'a sense of existing'; it therefore deserves 'recognition'
and 'affirmation of its existence.' ,175 They argue that not allowing Que-
bec to secede is a suppression of its identity, and thus a form of cultural
oppression. 176 The question that arises is whether every group that be-
lieves it has a distinct identity should have the right to form an indepen-
dent state. In response to this question, commentators have proposed that
because of an international system comprised of nation-states, every "na-
tion," or distinct people, must acquire it own state in order to stand on
equal footing with other nations that have states. 177 Peoples without states
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Richardson, supra note 151.
173. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
174. Guglielmo, supra note 150, at 208. Guglielmo also notes that the "Quebecois
recognize that even within their own province, where they exert considerable control over
cultural and education matters and enjoy a high degree of political participation, there is
still something missing. And that perception is not wrong: short of independence, without
a state, they are still a 'second-class' nation." Id. at 197.
175. Stark, supra note 158.
176. See Guglielmo, supra note 150, at 207-208.
177. Guglielmo, supra note 150, at 197.
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even if they are fairly autonomous are at a severe psychological disad-
vantage.178 While some aspects of this argument may have merit, in prac-
tice the theory could not be fully implemented without leading to a world
system that is composed of smaller and smaller, more homogenous
states. 179 Thus, most scholars have rejected this theory as illegitimate. 80
Although the Supreme Court did not consider cultural oppression,
nor suppression of identity, it is unlikely that Quebec would have the
right to secede on this ground. Even if there is a limited right to self-
determination based on cultural oppression, the Quebec/Canada situation
does not rise to the level necessary to be considered oppression in that
there is no immediate and grave threat to French culture. This conclusion
is supported by Eastwood's contention that:
permitting groups such as the Quebecois in Canada to invoke the
right of secession based upon cultural or group identity alone
would threaten to open the floodgates of secession, and could ex-
acerbate group conflicts. It is difficult to imagine any clear limits
upon a secession right that permits groups to secede from plural-
istic, non-oppressive states such as Canada.' 81
One of the features of modem society is the amalgamation of cultures
and the gradual erosion of cultural distinctions. While the Quebecois may
rightly believe that French culture is being assimilated, it is not solely
because they are a part of Canada, but rather because integration is a
global phenomena.
c. Former Colony
There is almost complete agreement that the right of self-
determination applies to former colonies, 182 at least if the colonies were
178. Id.
179. Id. at 198.
180. Id.
181. Eastwood, supra, note 96, at 342.
182. The right of former colonies to self-determination was specifically addressed in
the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and People. G.A. Res.1514, U.N. GAOR 15"h sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.Doc. A/4684
(1961). This Declaration was the first to use say that all peoples have a right to self-
determination. The Declaration states "the subjugation of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights; it is con-
trary to the United Nations Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion of world
peace and co-operation." Id. See also Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 103, at 604.
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dominated by a people of a different racial background.183 It is clear that
Quebec does not fall into the traditional category of a colony, since that
definition is quite narrow. The United Nations has defined a colony as "a
territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or
culturally from the country administering it" and "arbitrarily placed in a
position or status of subordination vis a vis the metropolitan state." Que-
bec cannot be considered a colony under this definition because it does
not satisfy all of the requirements. The French settled Quebec in the
early 1600's.184 It was later conquered by the British. Quebec remained a
British colony distinct from the rest of Canada until 1867 when Canada
East and Canada West merged under the British North America Act.185
Since the union, the two groups have been represented equally in govern-
ment. Furthermore, Quebec and Canada are geographically connected.
While there may be a cultural distinction, neither group has attempted to
subordinate the other and each group has the power to "administer" to
itself through the provincial governments.
In support of their claim, secessionists can argue that Quebec is only
a part of Canada because it was conquered and colonized by the British.
This argument does have merit, since if the French had retained control
over Quebec it is extremely improbable that a union with a British col-
ony would have ever taken place. However, the fact that Quebec is
equally represented in Canadian government, the lack of oppression and
the territorial connectedness seems to override the validity of this argu-
ment. Furthermore, it is significant that it was the British who colonized
Quebec and not the Canadians. If Quebec was seeking independence
from Britain most likely it would be considered a former colony. None-
theless, Canada, as such, has never sought to subjugate Quebec but rather
to work with it for both groups mutual prosperity.
Having determined that Quebec is not a traditional former colony
whether there is a right to self-determination outside of the context of
decolonization must be examined. Hector Espiell, the special reporter for
the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, explained that there is "unquestioned ac-
ceptance in international law of the fact that the right to self-
determination applies only to peoples under colonial and alien domina-
183. See Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AJIL 459 (1971).
184. See generally JOHN FITZMAURICE, QUEBEC AND CANADA: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE (1985) (discusses the history of Quebec and the origins of the nationalist
movement).
185. Kelly, supra note 99, at 256. See also Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 103,
at 592-598.
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tion."1 86 Indeed, prior to the Declaration of Friendly Relations 18 7 the ma-
jority of states in the United Nations asserted that self-determination was
limited to the right to be free from colonial domination. 188 This assertion
was reiterated in the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on
Western Sahara. 189 That opinion counsels that the General Assembly in-
tended to give only decolonized people a legal right to self-
determination. 190 Some commentators have suggested that it is inherently
unfair to give one group of people a right to self-determination and deny
it to another group based solely on the location of the territory in ques-
tion. As Judge Dillard stated in his separate opinion in Western Sahara,
"it is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the
territory the destiny of the people." 19'
Indeed, United Nations Declarations that deal with the issue of self-
determination on the surface do not make a distinction based on the loca-
tion of a territory. In general, they state that "all peoples" have the right
to self-determination. 92 Neither the U.N.'s International Covenant on Ec-
onomic, Social and Cultural Rights, nor the Helsinki Final Act give any
special status to former colonies. 93 The Vienna Declaration and the Dec-
laration of Friendly Relations do, however, make special mention of peo-
ple under colonial domination. The Vienna Declaration does not restrict
the right of self-determination to former colonies, but merely states that
colonial domination should be taken into account in determining whether
a people have a right to self-determination. 94 The Declaration on
Friendly Relations states that one of the purposes of the right of self-
determination is "to bring a speedy end to colonialism;"'' 95 however, the
Declaration also does not restrict the right solely to peoples under colo-
nial rule. 196
Even though the Conventions are not restrictive, in a practical sense,
the right of self-determination and secession has only been applied to
peoples in former colonies. The primary exception to this in recent years
186. Hill, supra note 113, at 125 quoting Hector Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-
Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions 11979 U.N. Sales No. E.
79 XIV 5 para. 56.
187. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76.
188. Kirgis, supra note 98, at 309.
189. Western Sahara (Morocco v. Spain) 1975 I.C.J. 12.
190. Id. at 36.
191. Id. at 122 (Separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
192. See supra notes 75-78.
193. Id.
194. Vienna Declaration, supra note 77.
195. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 76.
196. Id.
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is the partitioning of Yugoslavia and the secession of Croatia, Slovenia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 197 These provinces were part of an existing
member state of the United Nations. Since the provinces were not a for-
mer colony, under the principle of territorial and political integrity they
did not have a clear right to secede. 198 The United Nations under the
Declarations of Friendly Relations eventually recognized the secession of
these states. 199 Some commentators note that the recognition of the for-
mer Yugoslavian Republics' right to secede may indicate a new era in
which the right to self-determinatioi will be expanded to include more
groups.200 However, as Eastwood explains, "even if the internationals
community's prompt recognition of the seceding Yugoslav republics
marks the beginning of a new, more permissive approach to secession in
state practice the recognition of a right of secession based upon state
practice and international custom is not imminent. 20'
The Declarations on Friendly Relations provides that in certain cir-
cumstances the right to self-determination may be applied to groups that
are not considered traditional former colonies.20 2 These circumstances in-
clude subjection of people to "subjugation, domination and exploita-
tion ' 203 and forcible oppression of minority groups. If the government is
not representative, the oppressed group may be treated as if they were
under colonial domination and will have the right to self-determination. 2°4
In essence, they will be considered a pseudo-colony.205 There may be an
exception to the former colony requirement if there is oppression of a
minority group within a state. If a group is not a minority in a former
colony, and cannot prove oppression, it is unlikely that the will be con-
sidered to have the right to self-determination.
To reiterate, most commentators and international leaders agree that
to have the right to self-determination and secession, a group must be
seeking independence from colonial domination. If they are not under co-
lonial domination the people must show that they are oppressed to be
considered a pseudo-colony and have the right to unilaterally claim inde-
pendence. It is evident that Quebec is not a colony under the United Na-
tions definition of a colony. For groups in the situation of the Quebecois
197. Hill, supra note 113, at 130.
198. Id. at 131.
199. Id.
200. Eastwood, supra note 96, at 332.
201. Id.
202. Hill, supra note 113, at 131.
203. Declaration on Friendly Relations supra note 76.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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a balancing test may be applied between the level of oppression and the
degree that foreign domination played in creation of the situation. Even if
it can be argued that foreign domination was the primary cause of Que-
bec's union with Canada, the lack of historical oppression diminishes the
forcefulness of this argument. As discussed in the section on oppression,
Quebec is not oppressed to the level is necessary to have a valid claim to
the right to self-determination under a pseudo-colony theory.
C. Scrutinizing Self-Determination Claims
Another factor considered in evaluating whether a group has the
right to secede is the degree of destabilization that secession will cause
in the region. If the secession will cause a high degree of destabilization
the group must show that the government is highly oppressive and unrep-
resentative. 2°6 As Kirgis explained it, "[i]f a government is at the high
end of the scale of democracy, the only self-determination claims that
will be given international credence are those with minimal destabilizing
effect. If a government is extremely unrepresentative, much more destabi-
lizing self-determination claims may well be recognized." 207
The degree of destabilization is crucial in determining the level of
scrutiny that should be applied to the Quebecois claim. In short, all se-
cessions cause destabilization and should be scrutinized carefully. Moreo-
ver, there is some concern that if Quebec secedes Quebec and the rest of
Canada might fragment further.20 8 The majority of Montreal is English
speaking, and there is a fear that if Quebec secedes, Montreal, Quebec's
capital city, may have an incentive to separate. 209 There are three main
concerns about Quebec's secession's effect on the rest of Canada.
First, there is speculation that if Quebec secedes the "glue of feder-
alism" 210 would disappear and that British Columbia, Alberta and Onta-
rio, the wealthier provinces, may refuse to support the poorer prov-
inces. 211 The second concern is that an independent Quebec would cut
off, geographically at least, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia,
206. Kirgis, supra note 98, at 311-312.
207. Id. at 312.
208. Charles F Doran, Will Canada Unravel? FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Septemberl996/Oc-
tober 1996. "Neither the Canadian federal government nor the Quebec separatist govern-
ment nor outside analysts favoring a split in Canada predict any fragmentation of Canada
beyond Quebec. Ottawa probably has felt it must downplay all hints of the danger of dis-
unity. Yet recently Ottawa has reversed that policy ...... Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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and Prince Edward Island from the rest of Canada. 212 Finally, some spec-
ulate that secession would heightened the "feeling of alienation from and
dominance by the economic power of Ontario ' 213 in the Western prov-
inces. These three problems may lead to a demand for increased auton-
omy in the remaining provinces or may lead to further fragmentation of
Canada. As one commentator put it, "If we're not careful the question
won't be whether Quebec separates, but how many provinces join the
U.S." ' 2 1 4 While this is an alarmist view, it is evidence that if Quebec
were to unilaterally secede it would cause a tremendous amount of
destabilization within Canada. Therefore, before Quebec can have the
right of secession they must show that the Canadian government is
highly oppressive and unrepresentative. As the forgoing discussion illus-
trates, supporters of secession have not been able to demonstrate severe
oppression or a lack of representation.
D. Summary of Self-Determination
Since Wilson first articulated the concept, there has been a dispute
about what exactly the right to self-determination confers. Most commen-
tators agree, and the United Nations Declarations declares, that the right
of self-determination gives a people the right to participate in the govern-
ment of their choice. If they are not allowed to participate in govern-
ment, and are oppressed or under colonial domination, the right of self-
determination may also include the right of secession.215 To have a right
to secede a group must be a people, must be oppressed and must be a
former colony or pseudo-colony.216 The Quebecois, while they can be
considered a distinct people, do not have the right to unilaterally secede
under international law217 because they are neither oppressed nor under
colonial domination.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Editorial, PQ Platform Includes Plans for Declaration and Referendum, THE
GAZETrE (MONTREAL), July 28, 1994, at B3, quoted in Tim Gebert, Regional Report: The
Future of Quebec, 4 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 185 (1995).
215. See supra notes 162-206 and accompanying text.
216. Id.
217. "The United Nations has indicated that one reason a secession attempt may be
invalid is that the constitutional provisions of the sovereign member state in question
were violated." This indication is another reason that Quebec's unilateral secession may
be invalid under international law. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 102, at 812.
1999l
242 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
IV. SHOULD A DOMESTIC COURT DECIDE WHETHER A PEOPLE HAVE THE
RIGHT TO SECEDE?
The preceding analysis indicates that the Canadian Supreme Court's
decision is equitable to all parties and is in accordance with the princi-
ples of international law regarding secession. After the release of the de-
cision, Bouchard declared, "It is not up to the Supreme Court to deter-
mine the legitimacy of Quebecois' right to decide their future," and
announced his plans to proceed with another referendum. 218 While
Bouchard may not be an objective observer, his declaration does bring up
an interesting point: Should the Court have made the determination that
the Quebecois do not have the right to secede under international law?
Many states invoke Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, in
answering the question of jurisdiction of state courts to decide questions
of self-determination. They insist that disputes over secession are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 219 Indeed, a state's right
to decide issues that effect it can be characterized as one of the central
principles of sovereignty. 220 However, recent developments indicate that a
majority of states agree that compliance with United Nations' principles,
especially those pertaining to protection of human rights, can no longer
be regarded as a matter of domestic jurisdiction. 221 There are many rea-
sons that a domestic court should not decide questions of secession. Pri-
mary among them is that the state is inherently interested in the outcome
of the decision, the involvement of the international community would
give more credence to the decision, and that for a new state to be formed
the international community must recognize it and it would be easier for
all if the community got involved at the front end.222
The desire for states to maintain their territorial integrity and politi-
cal unity makes them an interested party in the decision. As an interested
party, the decision by any branch of the government may not be given
much credibility in the estimation of the group seeking to secede from
that government. As stated earlier, the Canadian Court's decision seems
to be an impartial assessment of the rights and obligations of all parties
involved and illustrates that the Court understands the sentiments of the
Quebecois independence movement. Indeed, people on both sides of the
issue claimed to be satisfied with the judgment and said that it confirmed
218. Bruce Wallace, Moment of Decision, MACLEAN'S, August 24, 1998, available in
1998 WL 17370356.
219. Stromseth, supra note 144, at 372.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 373.
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what they had been arguing..223 If the parties had not embraced the deci-
sion some feared that it would again stir up passions and increase the de-
mand secession.224 If the decision was made by an international body,
whether the United Nations or the International Court of Justice, it would
eliminate this fear inasmuch as the group seeking secession would be en-
sured of greater impartiality. Moreover, the group claiming independence
could not use the decision as a rallying point by claiming that it illus-
trates that the state is oppressive or unrepresentative. As Frankel noted,
"affected states should be encouraged to look at UN involvement as a
blessing rather than a curse in that it will bring considerable meditative
and diplomatic resources to bear on the problem in an effort to arrive at
a just and peaceful solution. 25
Another reason that the international community should get involved
early in the process centers around the need for that community to recog-
nize the seceding state. The Court itself recognized that the success of
any secession would be dependent on recognition by the international
community.2 26 In the current system, individual countries recognize seces-
sionist movements when they feel that it is in their political interests.
227
There is often not an objective reason for a countries decision to recog-
nize or not recognize a movement.2 28 The decisions are often based not
on an examination of a group's right to self-determination, but on an ex-
amination of which group is likely to win the dispute.229
When a country recognizes a secessionist movement or supports that
movement that country necessarily creates a conflict with the parent
state.230 Countries are often reluctant to recognize even a valid claim to
self-determination because of the fear of retaliation by the sovereign.
231
There is a fear that any intervention by a third party "'although morally
justifiable, might be imprudent due to the potential carnage and risks to
world order. ' 232 This fear has caused the international community to
adopt a hands off approach until the outcome secessionist movement is
223. Graham Fraser, Day of Decision: The Quebec ruling: Canada must negotiate
after Yes vote Supreme Court rejects unilateral secession, but says Quebeckers' wishes
can't be ignored, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, August 21, 1998, at Al.
224. Id.
225. Frankel, supra note 135, at 545.
226. In Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, T 103.
227. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 102, at 812.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 803.
230. Id. at 811.
231. Id. at 803.
232. Eastwood, supra note 96, at 339.
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clear.233 "International inactivity, inattention, and legitimation of violent
outcomes is a recipe for continued instability, violence, and oppression.
Any new system for dealing with secessionist movements must involve
automatic, active engagement on the part of the international commu-
nity."' 234 Focusing the world's attention on secessionist claims, may lead
governments to resist the temptation to suppress those movements
through military action. This would ensure greater protection for minori-
ties claiming the right to self-determination, would reduce the likelihood
of secessionist movements turning into civil wars and would increase
peace and stability in the world.
Despite the benefits of international involvement early on, there is
reluctance by the United Nations to interfere with a member state's sov-
ereignty. This reluctance is based on the fact that the United Nations
Charter recognizes the territorial integrity of all states. 235 However, it
must be remembered that the Charter also recognizes the right to self-
determination.2 36 While the principle of self-determination maybe
subordinate to the principle of territorial integrity 37 further support for
international involvement at the earliest stages of secessionist movements
are found in Article 39 of the UN Charter. Article 39 states that the "Se-
curity Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace ...
and make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken." 238
As discussed earlier, secessions cause destabilization. Destabilization may
be considered a threat to peace and authorize the involvement of the Se-
curity Council.2 39 This is not to say that there was any threat to peace
233. Frankel, supra note 135, at 545.
234. Frankel, supra note 135, at 544.
235. Preamble to the UN CHARTER.
236. U.N. CHARTER Art 1, para. 2, Art. 55 and Art. 73(b).
237. Gerry Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the
Postcolonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 266 (1996).
The principle of self-determination was clearly subordinate to the prohibi-
tion on the use of force, to the right to territorial integrity (Article 2(4)), and to
the general commitment to ensuring peace and security (Chapter VII, for exam-
ple), all of which were regarded as the post-war international system's founda-
tional norms. In fact, the Charter is the most tentative of all U.N. instruments
on the matter of self-determination.
Id.
238. UN CHARTER Art. 39.
239. Ebenroth and Kemner have proposed a system in which all secessionist claims
would have to meet three requirements: 1) have traditional characteristics of a state, 2)
have a willingness to follow the UN Charter, and 3) obtain consent of the parent state.
All secessionist claims under this system would be subject to review by the UN Security
Council and the International Court of Justice. According to Ebenroth and Kemner this
"system would assist in averting armed conflicts in cases of secession. Ebenroth & Kem-
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caused by the Canadian Court's decision. Rather the goal of this argu-
ment is to refute the notion that respect for territorial integrity prohibits
international involvement, and suggest that since it is not prohibited, the
United Nations should take a more active role in disputes over a peoples
right to self-determination.24°
A final reason that the United Nations should take a more active
role is its experience, and the experience of the International Court of
Justice, in resolving disputes involving issues of self-determination. The
International Court of Justice has issued numerous advisory opinions re-
garding the right of various groups to self-determination. The basis of a
group's rights to self-determination lie in the United Nations Declara-
tions. The International Court has extensive experience in interpreting
these documents. The Canadian Supreme Court is unquestionably the fi-
nal authority on questions of Canadian Constitutional law, and it must
decide whether secession is valid under the Canadian Constitution. The
Canadian Court is not, however, the definitive authority on questions of
international law, that authority rests in the United Nations and the Inter-
national Court of Justice. The Canadian Court's decision is exemplary in
nearly every respect. However, it would have been more so if the Court
had referred questions of international law to an international tribunal. 241
By doing so, they would serve as an example to other states in similar
disputes, and would have established an influential precedent for all
countries in assessing the right of a people to self-determination. Even
though the Court stated that it was not attempting to act as a interna-
tional tribunal or bind any subsequent decision by an international
court,242 because of the magnitude of the decision and the international
implications, it would have been preferable if the Court sought the advice
of an international tribunal in support of its decision.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Canadian Supreme Court's opinion in In Re Seces-
sion of Quebec that a unilateral declaration of independence would vio-
late Canadian and international law is in conformity with the principles
of international law articulated in United Nations Declarations and inter-
national case law. Although the Quebecois may be a distinct people,
ner, supra note 102 at 810.
240. See also Stromseth, supra note 144, at 370-74.
241. The Court did announce that it was not attempting to act as an international tri-
bunal or purporting to substitute its decision for a later determination by and international
court. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
242. In Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 4, 13.
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based on the fact that they are not oppressed and have meaningful access
to government they are not entitled exercise the right of unilateral seces-
sion. Despite the fact that the Court's decision is an equitable assessment
of the rights and obligations of the parties involved under international
law, the decision would have more credence if the Court had sought the
advice of an international tribunal. The importance of international in-
volvement in attempted secessions cannot be underestimated. Early in-
volvement not only ensures that the rights of the minority group are pro-
tected but may lessen the destabilizing effects of attempts at secession.
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